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Introduction 
This is a study of the complications encountered by a small 
power when it attempts to extract itself from a contractual 
relationship with larger ones. 
After Norway's entry into the League of Nations in 1920, the 
Norwegian government approached the four great powers 
Britain, Germany, France and Russia - which had guaranteed 
the integrity of newly-independent Norway in 1907 - with a 
proposal to abrogate the integrity treaty. Largely owing to 
Soviet objections no solution to the question could be reac-
hed until 1924, and it was not until 1928 that the treaty 
finally went out of force. 
The episode is a minor one. It is nevertheless valuable for the 
insight it provides into the relationships between major and 
minor powers. What seemed at first sight a quite straight-
forward, almost routine procedure became complicated because 
each great power - not the Soviet Union alone - viewed the 
question in the light of its own preoccupations - strategic, 
political and ideological. Those preoccupations emerge clearly 
from the diplomatic exchanges which resulted from the 
Norwegian irtitiative. Norway's own diplomacy also comes 
under scrutiny. How well did this small and relatively in-
experienced state handle relations with its larger neighbours? 
Finally we have to consider the significance for Norwegian 
security of both the 1907 treaty and its disappearance. Was it 
merely 'a worthless scrap of paper',' or did it provide at lea~t 
a residual constraint on the behaviour of the great powers 
towards Norway during the First World War? Did its absence 
have any bearing on the traumatic events of April 1940? 
Although the origins of the integrity treaty have attracted 
considerable scholarly interest, few historians have devoted 
much attention to Norwegian foreign policy between the wars. 
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The best studies remain the second volume of Reidar Omang' s 
Norsk utenrikstjeneste, which covers the period 1913-28, and 
Ame Bergsgdrd's contribution to the post-war parliamentary 
enquiry into the events of 1940, 'Utrikspolitikk',' which 
concentrates on the period 1933-40. Neither makes any 
mention of the demise of the integrity treaty in the 1920s. 
The only historian to have examined the episode at any length 
is Egil Danlelsen, in his study of Norwegian-Soviet relations 
between the wars.3 In contrast to other parts of his book, 
however, he has not consulted the relevant documents from the 
archives of the Norwegian foreign ministry (Utenriksdeparte-
mentet). 
The core of the present study is based on those files: the three 
volumes of documents which take the integrity treaty question 
through from its ratification by the Storting in 1908 to the eve 
of the Second World War in 1939.' However, it also draws 
extensively on primary sources from the two great powers 
most directly concerned - Great Britain and the Soviet Union 
- as well as from the German foreign ministry. Great-power 
perspectives arc essential to an understanding of the question. 
Indeed it was through a chance reference in the Foreign Office 
files at the Public Record Office in London that the present 
author first became aware of its significance. It is not surpris-
ing that historians relying solely on Norwegian sources have 
failed to do so. Soviet sources are also unexpectedly revealing. 
The glasnost era in the former Soviet Union saw the publi-
cation of much important material, notably the diaries of 
Aleksandra Kollontai, the first Soviet minister to Norway. 
Moreover, as Norwegian reports from Moscow reveal, Soviet 
leaders were - perhaps paradoxically - more candid with the 
Norwegians than were any of the other powers. Chicherin took 
the Norwegian representative in Moscow into his confidence 
in a way that Lord Curzon would never have deigned to do 
with his counterpart in Londnn. 
The important consultative role played by the Norwegian 
parliament, the Storting, provides the historian with a further 
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source of great value. Although the influential foreign policy 
committee of the Stoning has left only a bare record of the 
subjects it discussed in this period,' the Storting itself held 
frequent debates on foreign policy behind closed doors. The 
'unspoken assumptions' underlying Norwegian foreign policy 
often emerge more clearly from the stenographic record of 
these secret sessions - from the exchanges between foreign 
ministers and their parliamentary critics - than they do from 
the cryptic files of the foreign ministry. 
The Norwegian integrity treaty of 1907 
On 7 June 1905 Norway seceded unilaterally from the 
Scandinavian union. For the great powers, the break-up of the 
union posed a threat to the stability of northern Europe and, 
more specifically, raised the question of what was to replace 
the treaty of 1855 by which Britain and France had guaran-
teed the territorial integrity of the SwediSh-Norwegian kingdom 
in exchange for a Swedish undertaking not to cede territory to 
Russia. The leaders of independent Norway for their part 
regarded their task as incomplete unless the new state's 
security was explicitly guaranteed by the great powers.' In No-
vember 1906 Norway formally appealed to the powers for a 
treaty which would guarantee both the country's integrity and 
its neutrality. The Norwegians also wished to include a 
reservation clause allowing Norway to go to the assistance of 
Sweden or Denmark if either should be attacked. Following 
protracted and complex negotiations they were obliged on 2 
November 1907 to sign a treaty with Great Britain, France, 
Germany and Russia which contained far less than had 
originally been hoped. Both the guarantee of neutrality and the 
Scandinavian reservation had been dropped: only a. guarantee 
of integrity remained. 
The integrity treaty imposed obligations on both Norway and 
the four great powers.7 Article I, aimed at ruling out the use 
of Norwegian territory in time of war, bound Norway not to 
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cede tenitory 'to any Power to hold on a title founded either 
on occupation, or on any other ground whatsoever.' Under 
Article 2 the four powers undertook to respect Norwegian 
integrity and, in response to an appeal from the Norwegian 
government, 'to afford to that Government their support, by 
such means as may be deemed the most appropriate, with a 
view to safeguarding the integrity of Norway.' Article 3 stated 
that the treaty would remain in force for ten years from the 
date of the exchange of ratifications (6 February 1908), and 
for further ten-year periods, unless it was 'denounced by any 
of the parties at least two years before the expiration of the 
said period.' If, however, one of the parties did denounce the 
treaty, 'such denunciation shall have effect only as far as that 
Power is concerned.' In other words the treaty could go out 
of effect only with the consent of all five signatories. 
Of the four great powers it was Great Britain that did most 
during the negotiations of 1906-7 to dilute the treaty's terms. 
Although the Foreign Secretary, Sir Edward Grey, was initially 
receptive to the idea of guaranteeing Norwegian neutrality, the 
British authorities gradually came to regard a guarantee for 
Norway alone as being undesirable if, as became clear, 
Sweden and Denmark would not agree to having their 
neutrality guaranteed at the same time. As far as Denmark was 
concerned, the British objection was principally on strategic 
grounds. The director of naval intelligence warned the Com-
mittee of Imperial Defence (CID) in February 1907 that 
Norwegian neutrality might handicap Great Britain in a war 
with Germany - if the latter occupied Denmark, Great Britain 
would need to seize a Norwegian port. The terms of the treaty 
might involve Great Britain in a war with Russia and France 
who would be obliged to defend Norwegian integrity." 
It was imperative to leave open the possibility of responding 
to a German attempt to close the Danish Straits. Sir Charles 
Hardinge, the head of the Foreign Office, wrote: 
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If in time of war the Straits remain open that is all we 
want. If Germany tries to close them we shall regard 
ourselves as absolutely free to do what we like and even 
to ignore the integrity of Norway should we require a 
naval base on the Norwegian coast.' 
The British thus drew a distinction between integrity and 
neutrality. Eyre Crowe, the head of the Western Department 
of the Foreign Office, minuted that a guarantee of integrity 
alone 'need not be held to prevent one of the guaranteeing 
powers from temporarily occupying Norwegian territory 
without any intention of retaining it. Such a course might 
conceivably be convenient to Germany or even England in 
case of a war with Russia, or to Russia in the converse 
case'.lO 
The case of Sweden was rather different. Here the objection 
to a guarantee of Norwegian neutrality was essentially politi-
cal. Britain's primary interest in Scandinavia was not the 
seizure of a Norwegian base but the stability of the entire 
Scandinavian peninsula." To this end it was vital to reassure 
Sweden, which had been alienated from both Britain and 
Norway in the aftermath of Norwegian independence. The fact 
that Sweden was not to be included among the signatories of 
the treaty was regarded in Stockholm as an affront. In the 
light of Sweden's long-standing fear of Russia, with which 
Britain concluded an entente in August 1907, there was a 
distinct danger that an isolated Sweden would gravitate 
towards Germany. To a far greater extent than the Swedes rea-
lised, the British thus worked for a treaty which would not 
raise insuperable barriers to Swedish-Norwegian reconcilation. 
'When we discovered that you did not desire a declaration of 
neutrality for Sweden', Grey told the Swedish minister in 
London, 'we considered it unsuitable for Norway to be 
declared neutral. ,12 
The Norwegian government was only imperfectly aware of the 
considerations lying behind Britain's diplomacy. They combi-
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with an exaggerated fear that Britain might seize a Norwegian 
port in the event of an Anglo-German naval war. Indeed for 
Jl'lrgen Ll'lvland, who negotiated the integrity treaty first as 
foreign minister and later as prime minister, the latter danger 
became something of an obsession." To this extent the treaty 
represented a residual check on Great Britain as the only 
power which had the capacity to violate Norwegian neutrality 
and might be tempted to do so in order to strengthen its 
position against Germany in time of war. However, during the 
Storting's debate on the ratification of the integrity treaty in 
January 1908 Ll'lvland chose to defuse possible criticism of the 
treaty by emphasising the role of Great Britain as Norway's 
diplomatic mentor." It was primarily on Britain's advice, he 
said, that Norway had agreed to the stripping down of its 
original requirements and their substitution merely by a 
!,'Uarantce of integrity. The tactic was successful. No trace of 
resentment at Britain's role appears to have surfaced during 
the debate. The main objection to the treaty was that it gave 
the impression of being directed against Sweden and thus 
impeded the process of reconciliation between the two count-
ries. 
The integrity treaty was nevertheless something of a dis-
appointment. Ll'lvland's original hope - that it might form the 
basis of a neutral Scandinavian bloc - had not been fulfilled. 
Nor was there any illusion that the treaty was of itself a 
sufficient guarantee of Norwegian security. Ll'lvland emphasis-
ed that it did not make defence redundant: on the contrary 
Norway's defences must be suffiCiently strong to enable it to 
maintain its obligations under the treaty." 
If the result of Norway's 'short-term venture into the danger-
ous world of international politics'" had so little practical 
value, was there any suggestion that it was a positive dis-
advantage to Norway? Few contemporary critics went this far. 
Some argued that it was irrelevant in a crisis situation; others 
pointed to its repercussions for relations between Sweden and 
Norway." Halvdan Koht, in a pamphlet published in the spring 
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of 1907, went further and argued that such a treaty could be 
exploited by the guaranteeing powers in order to exert undue 
influence over Norway's affairs." There appears to have been 
little open expression of the view that was to become prorni-
nent after the war (pp. 26-8 below) that the treaty was 
demeaning to Norway's status as an independent state. Yet, 
within a few months of its ratification, the integrity treaty 
could be seen to have had precisely this effect. On 23 April 
1908 two agreements were concluded affirming the territorial 
status quo in the countries bordering the North Sea and the 
Baltic Sea respectively. Norway was not among the signatories 
of the North Sea agreement. Norway's exclusion from a treaty 
which directly concerned its political and strategic interests 
was justified, like that of Belgium (whose neutrality was 
guaranteed by the treaty of 1839), by its status as a guarante-
ed state. Sweden and Denmark, however, were able to 
participate on equal terms with the other North Sea states: 
Britain, France, Germany and the Netherlands. It is possible 
that such episodes rankled with Norwegian diplomats, as well 
as with the generation of politicians that came to replace the 
'men of 1905' in the years following the First World War. 
The integrity treaty appears to have provoked little public 
discussion between 1908 and the outbreak of war. In 1915, 
however, its future began to be the subject of debate. This 
was because of the provision of Article 3 that, if it was to go 
out of effect on the tenth anniversary of its ratification, in 
February 1918, notice had to be given two years in advance: 
in other words by February 1916. A pseudonymous article in 
the Swedish liberal (Venstre) journal Forum of February 1915, 
probably written by the former Swedish foreign minister 
Ehrensviird, wished to see the treaty disappear because it was 
an obstacle to improved relations between Sweden and 
Norway - an opinion shared by Brunchorst, the Norwegian 
minister in Stockholm." Bredo Morgenstieme, Professor of 
Jurisprudence at Christiania University, opposed this view. His 
article in the Law Quarterly Review of October 1915 argued 
that the treaty, though its terms could be fulfilled only if 
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Norway maintained forces adequate to defend its neutrality, yet 
had some moral value: 'For it cannot be doubted tbat such a 
breach of a solemn treaty, quite recently concluded, would be 
judged more severely by public opinion tban other breaches of 
international law.'20 
More importantly, both the foreign ministry aod the govern-
ment had decided tbat the treaty should remain in force.2l A 
Storting motion to denounce tbe treaty was rejected, with only 
tbe eighteen socialist members voting in favour, on 29 January 
1916. Realism was tbe order of tbe day. Foreign minister 
Ihlen told the Storting that Norway would run great risks if it 
made aoy move to alter tbe status quo.22 The belligerent 
powers would not be impressed by tbe argument that the 
treaty was unnecessary in view of Norway's record in main-
taining its neutrality, or that it was incompatible with Nor-
way's dignity. Any reference to the possibility of closer 
cooperation with Sweden would raise tbe spectre of a 
Norwegian-Swedish defensive alliance. None of tbe powers 
would regard the treaty's disappearance witb equanimity; 
Norway would be obliged to undertake new measures to 
demonstrate its continuing will to neutrality. The Norwegian 
government was congratUlated by tbe Russiao minister, who 
spoke of 'une acte de graode sagesse poJitique', and by his 
French colleague. There appears to have been no response 
from the British legation." 
While aoy move to denounce the treaty during tbe war would 
undoubtedly have drawn unwelcome attention to Norway, there 
is little sign that its existence acted as a deterrent to any of 
tbe belligerent powers. Britain was tbe only power which both 
possessed tbe meaos to occupy Norwegian territory aod had an 
incentive to do so. In 1917 the question of tbe occupation of 
a Norwegian port in support of tbe 'northern barrage' (a mine 
barrier across the North Sea) was under consideration by tbe 
British Admiralty and War Cabinet." At one point the Admir-
alty suggested tbat there was 'reason to believe tbat Norway 
would not object to such action on our part, and might even 
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welcome it as tending to bring the war to a more speedy 
conclusion.'2.S However Sir Mansfeldt Findlay, the British 
minister in Christiania, warned that Norway would in no 
circumstances agree to a British occupation, and in early 1918 
the idea of a Norwegian base was dropped from the plan." On 
this occasion as on others 'the strength of Norwegian neutrali-
ty was a significant deterrent'; the British acknowledged that 
'the risks of converting Norway into an ally were greater than 
the benefits which could be expected from a foothold in 
Scandinavia'." At no point, however, did the integrity treaty 
enter into the British debate; indeed the files betray no 
knowledge of its existence. No doubt the treaty would have 
come into play if Great Britain had decided to violate Nor-
wegian neutrality. However, it would have functioned not as 
a deterrent but merely a~ a legal stick with which to beat the 
British, in the sense that had been suggested by Morgen-
stierne in 1915. 
The treaty after the First World War 
Norway's diplomatic position at the end of the First World 
War was problematic in a number of respects. Some of the 
difficulties were of Norway's own malting, notably the 
disputes with the wine-producing countries - France, Spain 
and Portugal - which resulted from the outcome of a re-
ferendum on prohibition in October 1919. Others arose from 
the drive for a 'greater Norway', directed mainly towards the 
Arctic region. A prolonged dispute with Denmark over 
Greenland was not settled until the Hague Tribunal came 
down in favour of Danish sovereignty in 1933. Norway was 
successful in obtaining international recognition of its so-
vereignty over the Svalbard (Spitsbergen) archipelago but only, 
as we shall see, at the cost of greatly complicating its relations 
with the new Soviet government. In other respects Norway's 
exposed poSition was an unavoidable outcome of the four 
years of war in which, though not a belligerent, it had placed 
its economic resources and shipping largely at the disposal of 
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the Allies, and of the revolutionary upheavals which had 
shaken Europe since 1917. By 1918 NOIway was bound to the 
West by ties of sympathy and self-interest. It wa~ difficult if 
not impossible for Norway to strike out on a path which was 
not broadly in line with the wishes of Great Britain and 
France. In the early post-war years this was to entail, among 
other things, abandoning neutrality in favour of membership of 
the League of Nations and going along with Western ostracism 
of the new Soviet regime in Russia. 
Yet Norwegians had considerable reservations about taking 
both of these steps. The decision to join the League was taken 
less out of conviction than from a desire to avoid the isolation 
which would ensue if Norway was not numbered among its 
founding members." Since relations with Russia touched on 
Norwegian interests at many points, Norway could not view 
a breach with the Soviets with equanimity even though it was 
obliged to bow to Western pressure and, along with Sweden 
and Denmark, broke off diplomatic relations in November 
1918. Until Finland became an indepcndent state and acquired 
an outict to the Arctic Ocean at Pctsamo, Russian territory 
bordered on that of Norway in the far north. There remained 
many unresolved territorial issues in the Arctic, notably the 
question of soverei!,'Ilty over Svalbard. Russia was also an 
important customcr for the Norwegian fishing industry. Finally, 
there were close links between the Norwegian labour move-
ment, which wa~ among the most radical in western Europe, 
and the new Soviet leadership. The Liberal and Conservative 
politicians, who alternated in a succession of short-lived 
governments in the early 1920s, were thus subject to conflict-
ing pressures. Western blandishments and domestic political 
fears made them wish to keep the Soviets at arm's length. 
Economic self-interest and the desire to regulate the situation 
in the Arctic pushed them in the direction of re-establishing 
commercial relations with Russia (in 1921) and ultimately (in 
1924) towards full diplomatic recognition of the Soviet 
government. The Soviets for their part were fully aware of 
the Norwegian predicament. On such matters as exports of fish 
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and manufactured goods, or fishing and hunting rights in the 
White Sea and Arctic Ocean, they had the power to grant or 
deny Norway's wishes. They also held the key to two diplo-
matic issues of importance to Norway. One was the question 
of Norwegian sovereignty over Svalbard. The other was that 
of the integrity treaty. Between 1921 and 1924 they exploited 
each of these concerns in pursuit of what was probably their 
principal goal: de jure recognition. 
The Svalbard question was the product of a widespread feeling 
at the end of the war that Norway's sacrifices of men and 
shipping in the Allied cause entitled it to some recompense. 
This sentiment, which was reciprocated to some degree in the 
Allied capitals," was articulated most vocally by Count Fritz 
Wedcl Jarlsberg, the Norwegian minister in Paris, who actively 
lobbied the peacemakers gathered there in 1918-19.30 For a 
short time Norwegian ambitions encompassed the idea of an 
East African colony, but they were directed mainly towards 
colder climes. The government wisely rejected Wedel Jarls-
bcrg's proposal that Norway should lay claim to all or part of 
the Russian Murman coast. It concentrated instead on winning 
international recol,'11ition of Norwegian sovereignty over 
Svalbard. The archipelago was a no-man's land in which not 
only Norway, but also Sweden and Russia had traditional 
interests, while the citizens of a number of other powers, 
including Great Britain, had mineral rights there. The Peace 
Conference ultimately decided in favour of Norway and 
Norwegian sovereignty was recognised in a treaty of February 
1920. Only the Soviet government withheld ratification. It 
continued to do so until 1924. 
The prospect of Norwegian membership of the League of 
Nations, and of a new system of collective security, called 
into question not only Norway's traditional policy of neutra-
lity but also its one existing security arrangement with foreign 
powers: the integrity treaty of 1907. A committee of experts 
appointed by the government to look into the conditions for 
Norwegian membership decided that the terms of the treaty, 
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'which promise Norway the support of a limited number of 
great powers' were incompatible with 'the system of mutual 
and direct guarantees' established by Article 10 of the League 
Covenant. 31 Article 20, moreover, declared that all treaties 
which were incompatible with the Covenant were to be 
regarded as null and void. In addition, the expert committee 
suggested, it was contrary to the spirit of the pact that a state 
should be guaranteed by powers which were not members of 
the League. The committee pointed out finally that Article I 
of the 1907 treaty, by which Norway undertook not to cede 
any part of its territory to any other power 'to hold on a title 
founded either on occupation, or on any other ground what-
soever', was incompatible with Article 16 of the Covenant, 
which bound states to allow the use of their territory for 
purposes authorised by the League. 
The expert committee appears to have given no serious 
thought to the possibility that the disappearance of the in-
tegrity treaty might have political as well as legal ramifica-
tions. Nor did it give any advice as to the procedure by which 
the treaty was to disappear from the world. However, it had 
placed the question on the political agenda. Once Norway had 
joined the League, as it did in March 1920, it was a problem 
that Norwegian diplomacy would be obliged to address sooner 
or later. 
The making of Nonvegian foreign policy 
In the early 1920s Norwegian foreign policy was in a state of 
flux not merely in relation to the outside world, but also in 
terms of its own administrative and political arrangements. 
Following the recommendations of a royal commission 
appointed in 1919, a major reform of the foreign service was 
undertaken in 1922, integrating the diplomatic and consular 
services, as well as the ministry at home and the missions 
abroad. Three of Utenriksdepartementet's officials were to play 
an important role in the formulation of policy on the integ-
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rity treaty question. The first was the ministry's permanent 
head from 1922 onwards, August Esmarch, described by a 
British minister as 'the most able and business-like official I 
have met in Norway. He is the only man at the Ministry Who 
is not afraid to answer a question in a straightforward way. '32 
However, where relations with the new Soviet government 
were concerned, Esmarch's position was influenced by his 
connections with Norwegian business interests who were 
seeking compensation for assets which had been confiscated 
by the Bolsheviks." Within Utenriksdepartementet questions of 
international law and League of Nations affairs were dealt 
with until 1922 by the 2nd Icontor and thereafter by the 
Felleskontor, both headed by Jens Bull. In the autumn of 1921 
the youthful Frede Castberg was appointed to the ministry as 
an expert in international law and League of Nations affairs." 
From 1928 he combined his role as adviser to Utenriks-
departementet with a professorship at Oslo University. 
Despite the relatively low priority attached to the conduct of 
foreign policy in Norway, Utenriksdepartementet was by no 
means left to its own devices in its handling of relations with 
foreign states. Given Norway's heavy dependence on foreign 
trade and the enormous size of its merchant fleet, it was 
inevitable that much attention would be paid to business 
interests. Indeed the promotion of Norwegian foreign trade and 
shipping had been one of the chief reasons for the creation of 
a separate Norwegian consular service, which in turn had 
helped to precipitate the break-up of the union between 
Sweden and Norway in 1905. However, the role played by 
business in the foreign policy-making process was perhaps 
excessive. Pressure from nonlt Norwegian interests was in-
strumental in the tough line adopted by the government 
towardS the Soviet Union on the question of hunting and 
fishing rights in the White Sea between 1921 and 1926." It 
has been suggested, not without justice, that to judge from 
Aleksamlra Kollontai's diaries, 'the price of Norwegian 
[diplomatic] recognition was virtually identical with the price 
for Norwegian herring.''' 
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Parliament also came to exert a growing influence over the 
making of Norwegian foreign policy between the wars. The 
process began in 1917 with the establishment by the Storting 
of a 'special committee for foreign affairs'. It was renamed 
the 'foreign policy committee' in 1922 and merged with the 
'constitutional committee' in December 1923. To an increasing 
extent the utenriks- og konstitutionskomite, usually known as 
the ulenrikskomite, functioned as 'an advisory body for the 
government'." Like the equivalent committees which emerged 
in Sweden (ulrikesniimnd) and Denmark (udenrigspoliliske 
ruevn), it was also a means of obtaining cross-party consensus 
in matters of foreign policy. Although they were often under 
no legal obligation to do so, governments found it politically 
desirable to consult the Storting on all foreign policy matters 
of importance." The British minister recorded in 1928 that 
'The debates arising out of the reports of the committee are 
frequently held behind closed doors, and it is somewhat 
remarkable that, in my experience, there appears to be very 
little leakage. ," It was therefore much more than a formality 
when, having reached a decision on how to deal with the 
integrity treaty the foreign ministry a.ked for the Storting'S 
approval. However, the role of the committee remained a 
matter of controversy among parliamentarians. This emerged 
with particular clarity when the Storting debated the integrity 
treaty question in closed session on 9 June 1923.40 
Although only one member of the Storting demanded that the 
foreign policy committee should be abolished as an emergency 
body which had outlived its usefulness,'! there was widespread 
disquiet about the way in which the government appeared to 
be using the committee as a means of shifting responsibility 
fTom itself on to the Storting. The sharpest criticism came 
from a member of the committee, the Conservative politician 
and newspaper editor Carl J. Hambro, who expressed his 
dissatisfaction with the way in which complex questions, like 
that of the inregIity treaty, were brought before members who 
had not been able to prepare in advance but who were then 
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associated with the decisions taken by the government.42 
Already making foreign policy his metier and later identified 
(unfairly) by the British legation as 'a fanatic, pro-Gennan, 
pro-Irish, and, in practice, everything that is anti-British'''' 
Hambro was to change his opinion of the committee when he 
became its chainnan in 1926. Indeed the British minister 
complained that during the period of Conservative rule from 
1926 to 1928 'the conduct of important foreign affairs lay in 
the hands of M. Hambro rather than in those of the Ministry 
concerned' .44 
To complicate matters further there were no fewer than five 
governments and six foreign ministers in the short period 
between 1920 and 1924. Gunnar Knudsen's ministry, which 
had been in power since 1913, resigned in June 1920. With it 
went the fonnidable but much criticised foreign minister Nils 
Claus Ihlen, who had dominated Norwegian foreign policy 
throughout the war years. The Conservative (H~yre) govern-
ment of O.B. Halvorsen, with Christian Michelet as foreign 
minister, lasted exactly a year. A man of charm and cultivat-
ion, Michelet was, according to the British minister, 'most 
unsatisfactory to deal with officially': 'he seemed incapable of 
giving a straightforward answer to the simplest questions, and 
on more than one occasion he was deliberately misleading. ," 
Aleksandra Kollontai found Michelet equally irritating but had 
little difficulty in dealing with his attempts to ingratiate 
himself." Halvorsen's government was replaced in June 1921 
by the Liberal (Venstre) ministry of Otto Blehr. Amold 
Rrestad, distinguished more as a theoretician than as a practical 
politician, served as foreign minister until May 1922, when he 
was brought down by a trade dispute with the wine-producing 
countries of Spain and Portugal.47 He was succeeded by Johan 
Ludwig Mowinckel, the Bergen Shipowner who was to 
dominate Norwegian politics for much of the inter-war period, 
heading three governments in the period 1924-35.48 In March 
1923 Halvorsen returned to power, again with Michelet as 
foreign minister. After Halvorsen' s death in May 1924 the 
Conservative ministry was headed for a brief period by 
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Abraham Berge before its fall in July. In July 1924 Mowinck-
el became head of his own Liberal ministry for the first time, 
while simultaneously holding the post of foreign minister. 
The fact that these changes of government made little diffe-
rence to the goals and methods of Norwegian foreign policy 
(though the Conservatives were more cautious than the 
Liberals on the question of de jure recognition of the Soviet 
regime) was further tribute to the consensual nature of policy 
making. In the Storting's secret debates on foreign policy 
during periods of Conservative government, Mowinckel was at 
pains to emphasise the common ground between the two main 
parties. He was glad, he said on 30 January 1924, that there 
was no party political disagreement on certain issues, and he 
hoped that 'where questions of foreign policy were concerned, 
party politics would also give way more to a united 
approach. '49 This was naturally due in part to the fact that any 
criticism of the government would rebound on himself as a 
former foreign minister and exponent of a virtually identical 
foreign policy. However the same sentiments were to be 
echoed by Hambro when he wrote during the Second World 
War of 'the important fact that in Norway ... foreign policy is 
considered a national affair as distinct from party politics. No 
small nation can afford to have its foreign relations made a 
matter of factitious controversy. We have also felt that there 
ought to be the fullest possible continuity in our foreign poli-
cy. ,'" Even the communist Scheflo acknowledged the need for 
a consensual foreign policy in a small country such as Norway 
- though he urged his colleagues not to take it too far." 
One further area, but one on which it remains difficult to 
obtain any firm knowledge, concerns the role of the king in 
Norwegian foreign policy-making. We know that King Haakon 
VII was extremely active throughout the period leading up to 
the signature of the integrity treaty in November 1907." He 
was also on close terms with successive British ministers to 
Norway, particularly Sir Mans[eldt Findlay, who served in 
Christiania from 1911 to 1924." When Findlay referred in his 
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despatches to 'a very high authority', the person in question 
was invariably the king. Utenriksdepartementet sent the king 
all important correspondence on the foreign policy issues of 
the day, including the integrity treaty. However, the king's 
personal role in the making of foreign policy certainly dimi-
nished after the end of the First World War. This was due in 
large measure to the emergence of the Storting's foreign 
policy committee. The foreign minister's duty to consult 
parliament was not easily reconcilable with that of consulting 
the king.54 
The Norwegian approach to the making of foreign policy was 
thus more consensual, but also more casual than wa~ the case 
in systems with more established procedures. These included 
all the European great powers, including the Soviet Union 
even in its early years, but also minor powers with long 
diplomatic traditions such as Sweden." There are resem-
blances, however, to another, much larger country which also 
favoured isolation and disliked foreign entanglements: the 
United States.56 Few in Norway were in a position to take a 
strategic view of Norwegian foreign policy interests. Indeed, 
bearing in mind the powerful forces in Norway which rejected 
anything that resembled power politics, there was a positive 
disincentive to do so. The Norwegian outlook on the world 
tended to be legalistic and moralistic, while displaying a 
hard-headed concem for Norway's economic interests abroad. 
At the same time there was a preoccupation with Norway's 
dignity as an independent state and a determination that it 
should not be compromised by too close an association either 
with Norway's Scandinavian neighbours or with the European 
great powers. Such attitudes were as prevalent among the 
officials of Utenriksdepartementet as elsewhere in the policy-
making establishment. Traces of a more cosmopolitan approach 
can be found among certain individuals - notably the king -
and in business circles, as well as within the diplomatic 
service. Veterans of the diplomatic struggle surrounding 
Norway's achievement of independence in 1905, such as 
Johannes Irgens in Rome or Wedel Jarlsberg in Paris, were 
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certainly capable of taking a broad view. At the same time it 
was precisely such figures as Wedel Jarlsberg, aptly described 
by a British diplomat in 1905 as being 'of an excitable and 
optimistic character,57 who, in the absence of clear guidelines 
from the foreign ministry, were apt to take impulsive steps 
which might have unforeseen and unwelcome consequences. 
NOnIJay's first attempt to abrogate 
the integrity treaty 1920-22 
Following Norway's entry into the League of Nations in 
March 1920 the government took no immediate steps to give 
effect to the expert committee's opinion in favour of abrogat-
ing the integrity treaty. It was characteristic of Norwegian 
policy making that the first initiative should have come from 
Wedel Jarlsberg. In November 1920 he proposed that Norway 
should give the League Secretariat written notice that the 
treaty was to be regarded as having lapsed. It was, he said, a 
matter of 'our status as a nation and member of the League'." 
'Unwelcome consequences' for Norway's international position 
would ensue if Norway 'continued to remain silent'. 
The Norwegian delegation at Geneva advised caution: any 
initiative should be addressed first to the signatory powers." 
This was sound advice even though two of the signatOries, 
Britain and France, could be expected to raise few difficulti-
es. Germany, however, was a defeated power and was not a 
member of the League of Nations. Wollebrek, the minister in 
Berlin, recommended that the German government should be 
approached at the same time as the other signatories. Germany 
had, after all, recognised the League Covenant as part of the 
peace treaty.'" Russia was still more problematical. The tsarist 
government had been replaced by a Soviet regime which was 
neither a member of the League nor officially recognised by 
Norway or any other Western country. The Soviets appeared, 
moreover, to have renounced the treaties concluded by their 
tsarist predecessors. It seemed that little could be done in this 
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direction until either the Soviet government received recogni-
tion or the Soviet Union became a member of the League of 
Nations." 
In June 1921 a much clearer message came from Geneva. The 
question had been examined by the League's legal experts and 
Ertk Colban, Norway's representative, had discussed it with 
the secretary general. Sir Eric Drummond. There were, it 
appeared, differing opinions as to the extent to which the 
treaty might be in conflict with the League Covenant. It was 
by now evident that the League, far from deprecating regional 
security arrangements, welcomed them in so far as they 
contributed to a more stable world. The Secretariat therefore 
wanted the Norwegian government to make no move for the 
time being.62 
Utenriksdepartcmentet's files contain no further discussion of 
the question until April 1922. There is no obvious explana-
tion for the gap. The ministry may have been waiting for 
another message from Geneva. It may simply have been too 
busy with other matters. In the summer of 1921 it was 
occupied with the negotiations which led to the conclusion of 
a provisional trade agreement with the Soviets on 2 Septem-
ber, by which Norway also gave the Soviet government de 
facto recognition. By the early spring of 1922 the foreign 
ministry was beginning to consider terms for de jure recogni-
tion and to prepare for Norway's participation in the Genoa 
conference which was to take place in April (and was to col-
lapse with the conclusion of the Rapallo treaty between 
Germany and the Soviet Union on 16 April). 
Utenriksdepartementct resumed its discussion of the integrity 
treaty on 5 April 1922. Acknowledging that the question of its 
compatibility with the League Covenant was still unresolved, 
Frede Castberg proposed that the ministry should 'either 
announce that the integrtty treaty should be regarded as having 
gone out of force, or terminate the treaty from 6 February 
1928.' As far as Russia was concerned, Castberg suggested 
25 
that 'the treaty might be regarded as having lapsed owing to 
the Soviet government's attitude towards Russia's older treaties 
in general. ," Jens Bull favoured a more clear-cut approach.64 
If the treaty was incompatible with the Covenant, he argued, 
Norway should have denounced it immediately. It was admit-
tedly now doubtful whether the treaty must necessarily be seen 
in this light, especially in view of the growing tendency to 
approve regional groupings and alliances. But since, as Bull 
pointed out, this was a tendency which Norway generally 
resisted, it added a further strong argument in favour of 
denunciation." So too, he added cryptically, did the current 
situations in Russia and Germany. Bull therefore came out 
strongly in favour of denouncing the treaty rather than merely 
announcing that it was no longer in force. However, he 
wanted this to take place at the appropriate time shortly before 
the expiry of the treaty in 1928 - in other words in 1926 - not 
four years in advance: 'We shall have to see how Europe (and 
the League of Nations) develop over the next 4 years.' 
Foreign minister Rrestad took a middle line between the 
solutions favoured by Castberg on the one hand and Bull on 
the other. He instructed his officials to draw up a proposition 
(proposisjon) to the Storting, putting forward the reasons for 
approaching the signatory powers with a statement that the 
treaty was no longer in force. If this approach did not work, 
the treaty should be denounced, even though its demise would 
then be delayed for some years." 
Utenriksdepartementet started to draft the proposisjon in late 
April 1922. In the early drafts no mention was made of the 
Soviet government - a quite remarkable omission which seems 
to have been based on the assumption (reflected, for example, 
in Castberg's minute of 5 April) that in the light of the Soviet 
government's rejection of the treaties signed by the tsarist 
regime, no formal communication was necessary. Yet the 
Soviet position on the Svalbard question should have alerted 
the Norwegians to the new regime's insistence that it was the 
legal successor to the rights of the tsarist government. 67 
Utenriksdepartementet evidently soon changed its mind and 
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decided that it was advisable to approach the Soviet govern-
ment along with the other powers. In doing so, however, the 
Norwegians did not mean to imply any recognition that the 
Soviets were the heirs to the tsarist government's treaty rights, 
merely to record the fact that the treaty had lapsed.'" On 16 
May, therefore, when the proposisjon had been completed, its 
contents were communicated confidentially both to the BIi-
tish, French and German legations and to the Soviet trade 
delegation in Ouistiania. 
Before discussing the reactions of the four great powers, it is 
worth considering the motives that lay behind the Norwegian 
initiative. In 1920, before Norway's entry into the League, the 
technical question of the integrity treaty's compatibility with 
the League Covenant had been the only matter of concern to 
the committee of experts. In its proposisjon to the Storting, 
the foreign ministry repeated the arguments that had been put 
forward in 1920 about the treaty's incompatibility with the 
Covenant, but also made reference to the change in political 
circumstances that had come about since 1907. The situation 
had altered so completely, it said, that the whole basis of the 
treaty had been removed (forrykket). 'The Department is 
thinking here in particular of the consequences that the world 
war, the revolutions in Russia and the conclusion of the 
Versailles peace treaty have had as far as Russia and Germany 
are concerned. ," A further consideration, adduced by Tidens 
Tegn on 3 June 1922, was a desire to demonstrate the 
harmonious relations between Norway and Sweden by remov-
ing a treaty which had been thought to be directed mainly 
against the latter country." There was something to be said 
for this assumption: it was on this ground that Mowinckel had 
attacked the treaty in the Storting as far back as 1908, and 
Mowinckel remained an active exponent of Scandinavian 
cooperation throughout the inter-war period.7l However Sir 
Mansfeldt Findlay, for one, was sure that such considerations 
'were not the principal grounds which led to the action of the 
Norwegian Government'" 'In fact', he went on, 'it does not 
seem to have occurred to them that they were losing a good 
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opportunity of legitimately improving relations with Sweden 
by emphasizing this point of view.' His supposition is con-
tinned by Utenriksdepartementet's files on the question, which 
contain no reference to Norway's relations with other Scandi-
navian governments, as well as by the absence of a 'Scandi-
navian' dimension in the Storting's debates on the integrity 
treaty. Findlay came up with a startlingly different explanation. 
He had, he reported, very high authority [Le. that of the king] 
for stating ... that the real reason on which the Norwegian 
Government based their action was the view that, in the 
present state of Gennany and Russia, both of whom were 
parties to the Integrity Treaty and neither of whom are 
members of the League of Nations, the Integrity Treaty might 
be used by both or either of these Powers in such a manner 
as to become a danger to Norway. I cannot say that I quite 
follow this train of thought." 
Infonnation from such a source clearly has to be taken 
seriously. It receives some support from the anxiety about 
Russia and Gennany expressed in Jens Bull's minute of 5 
April as well as from the foreign ministry'S alJusion to 'gre-
at changes' in the international situation in its proposisjon to 
the Storting. Presumably the fear was that either Russia or 
Gennany or both together might seek to use Norwegian 
territory in order to mount an attack on members of the 
League. If it seems as fanciful in retrospect as it did to 
Findlay at the time, the apprehension may nevertheless have 
been a real one in the aftennath of RapaIJo. The Soviet 
leadership certainly entertained such fears in reverse. 
However, the immediate circumstances of post-war Europe 
may have had less to do with the Norwegian decision than did 
older and more deep-seated - though not always fully articul-
ated - perceptions of Norwegian foreign policy interests and 
Norway's place in the world. Traditions of isolationism and 
hostility towards great-power politics remained strong. The 
integrity treaty was regarded as an unfortunate and perhaps 
dangerous hangover fTOm the era of great-power rivalries. 
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Membership of the League of Nations allowed Norwegians 
(along with many others) to persuade themselves that such 
commilments were no longer necessary. To these sentiments 
was added one that was perhaps even more powerful: national-
ism. The treaty was simply incompatible with Norway's digni-
ty as an independent state. This was the view aniculated by 
Wedel Jarlsberg when he first proposed the elimination of the 
integrity treaty in November 1920 (p. 22 above). It was shared 
by Thor von Ditten, Norway's minister in Berlin, when he 
condemned in 1919 the terms of the proposed Svalbard treaty 
as reducing Norway to vassal status and being 'as damaging 
to the development of a Norwegian sense of independence as 
the integrity treaty.''' Similar views were to be expressed 
during the secret Stoning debate on the integrity treaty on 9 
June 1923. The key word was formynderskap. Translatable as 
'guardianship' or 'tutelage', it was used by several speakers to 
describe the relationship established between Norway and the 
great powers by the treaty of 1907." The two impulses -
isolationism and nationalism - were expressed most revealingly 
when Mowinckel invited the Storting to recall the period after 
1905: 
Everyone now realises ... that this treaty was from the 
outset an extremely serious political mistake on Norway's 
part which, so far from strengthening us, has, on the 
contrary, weakened us and placed us under a formynder-
skap to an extent which must be a matter of regret to all 
of us. The security it was supposed to give us could well 
have proved a danger after the world war broke out. 
However, we have now reached the point where the treaty 
can no longer be seen to have any significance or value. 
The only question now is the procedure by which it is 
removed." 
Mowinckel was thus as critical of the policy makers of 1907 
as he had been when the treaty was first discussed by the 
Stoning in 1908 and he had described it as 'an ephemeral 
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document' [et d;!gnpapir].TI His judgment was endorsed by 
Hambro: 
I agree with Hr Mowinckel that the integrity treaty has 
not brought our country any real advantages. I have 
always regarded it as a docwnent demeaning to our 
national dignity which was signed at a time when we 
lacked any kind of training in foreign policy." 
Both men belonged to the generation that had come to 
maturity in the years before 1905. Their outlook, like that of 
many others, had been shaped by the struggle for independ-
ence [Tom Sweden and they resented any suggestion that 
Norway might continue to be subjected to the tutelage of 
larger powers. In this consensus. which transcended party 
differences and united politicians and diplomats. may be found 
the true 'unspoken assumptions' behind the Norwegian 
initiative. 
French. British and German reactions 
to the Norwegian proposal 
The most immediate reaction came from the French. Two 
members of the legation called within two days in order to 
discover precisely what the Norwegian government meant by 
its proposaL" Both were sympathetic but suggested that 
multilateral groupings were quite compatible with the League 
Covenant: indeed there was no obstacle to a collective 
guarantee from both members of the League and nonmem-
bers. This was clearly far from what the Norwegians had in 
mind. The German minister, Rhomberg, also responded 
positively, although he thought that Germany would not accept 
any interpretation based on Article 20 of the League Covenant 
since, in its view, this article applied only to members of the 
League.'" Following the advice of Friedrich Gaus, the Auswlir-
tiges Amt's legal expert, Rhomberg was instructed in June to 
confirm that this was Germany's official position." Findlay 
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volunteered no opInIOn on the matter. Unknown to the 
Norwegians, however, the despatch to London of 18 May in 
which he reported their proposal provoked a flurry of interest 
in the Foreign Office.'" It led ultimately to a discussion of the 
question by the Committee of Imperial Defence as a matter 
directly affecting Britain's strategic interests. 
The first Foreign Office response, from its legal adviser Sir 
Cecil Hurst, was that there seemed to be no legal ground for 
the Norwegian belief that the integrity treaty was incompatible 
with the League Covenant. He suggested that Norway should 
simply give notice of its intention to denounce the treaty when 
it was first entitled to do so, in February 1926." However Sir 
Eyre Crowe, the permanent under-secretary, quickly grasped 
that there was more to the Norwegian proposal than met the 
eye: 
The first question to be considered is whether the 
abrogation of the 1907 treaty would be to our advan-
tage, or the contrary. That depends on what Britain 
gains by the treaty. and at what price? 1 should like to 
have this properly considered." 
It was unusual for the head of the Foreign Office to take the 
initiative on such an apparently minor matter at such an early 
stage. But Crowe was unusually well acquainted with Norway. 
As head of the Western Departtnent until November 1914. and 
then as head of the newly created Blockade Departtnent, he 
had been intimately concerned with the negotiations for the 
integrity treaty in 1906-7 (pp. 8-9 above) and with the 
problem of Norwegian neutrality throughout the First World 
War. As early as 5 August 1914 Crowe had advocated 
bringing Norway and other neutral states into 'a system of 
fighting alliance ... surrounding the enemies.''' In October 
1916 he had written a long memorandum advising the Cabinet 
that on balance it would be to Britain's advantage if Norway 
were forced into the war by German aggression, since the 
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blockade of Gennany would then be considerably easier to 
maintain. B6 
In response to Crowe's request Esmond Ovey of the North-
ern Department produced a lengthy minute setting out the pros 
and cons of the Norwegian integrity treaty from the British 
point of view.'" Ovey, who had been first secretary at the 
Christiania legation during the war, suggested that Britain 
gained no advantage fTom the treaty in peace time, while in 
time of war it committed Britain to Norway's defence. More 
importantly, it placed constrainl~ upon Britain's own freedom 
of action: 
As a matter of fact, in the next great war it might very 
conceivabLy be advantageous and perhaps even essentiaL 
to this country to occupy a navaL base in Norway. It will 
perhaps be remembered that on the very eve of the 
armistice His Majesty's Government had actually gone 
so far as to invite the Norwegians to close their terri-
toriaL waters against enemy submarines, as it was 
considered imperative to stop the egress of German 
submarines into the open sea." To have seized a base in 
the great war wouLd have been in direct violation of the 
treaty of 1907, and wouLd have literally justified the 
Germans, French and Russians (in practice onLy the 
Germans) in going to the defence of Norway. A similar 
occasion might quite easily arise in the next war. 
If the treaty were denounced and substituted by the guaran-
tee of the League of Nations, Great Britain would no longer 
be prohibited from making use of Norwegian territory but 
would, on the contrary, have the right to do so in execution 
of its obligations under the League Covenant. In any future 
war Norway would probably again be of great importance to 
Britain 'owing to her friendliness and her geographical 
position, as blocking the only exit of Genman submarines into 
the open sea': 
32 
It seems probable that the Scandinavian powers, who 
succeeded in remaining neutral in the last war, will find 
means to do so in any future general war. Even then the 
right (or the absence of a distinct provision denying to 
His Majesty's Government the right) to pass troops 
through Norwegian territory would presumably include 
the right to pass naval forces through Norwegian 
harbours and would be extremely valuable without 
bringing the Norwegians directly into the war. 
For Great Britain, therefore, the balance of advantage seemed 
to be very much in favour of the abrogation of the treaty. 'If 
this view is correct,' Ovey wrote, 'the action of the Norwegian 
Government in wishing to bring about such a situation in the 
early future is somewhat surprising. In fact, it would appear 
that they can hardly have realised the point.' 
Ovey's advice was what Crowe wanted to hear. Proposing 
that the matter might be referred to the CID for considera-
tion, he remarked: 'My own view is that if Norway wishes 
to abandon whatever guarantees she has hitherto derived from 
the Integrity Treaty, we need not oppose her.''' Lord Balfour, 
the Foreil,'Il Secretary, was more than ready to support 
Crowe's proposal: 'I cannot imagine', he wrote, 'what good 
arguments can be adduced against allowing Norway to 
denounce the treaty as soon as she likes. ,90 
The Norwegian integrity treaty was discussed by the 
Committee of Imperial Defence on 12 July 1922." The 
members of the committee, chaired by Balfour and including 
the civilian and military chiefs of the three armed services as 
well as Wins ton Churchill (the Colonial Secretary) and a 
number of advisers, had before them copies of Findlay's 
despatches from Christiania, together with a Foreign Office 
leller incorporating the whole of Ovey's long minute. Crowe 
told the committee that 'from a pOlitical point of view no 
valid arguments existed against the denunciation of the Treaty, 
should Norway wish to abandon whatever guarantees she had 
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hitherto derived from the Treaty. The Treaty imposed upon us 
a burden from which we should be glad to be relieved'. Lord 
Beatty, the First Sea Lord, endorsed the Foreign Office's 
advice on behalf of the Admiralty, and the CID had little 
difficulty in agreeing that 'the proposed denunciation by the 
Norwegian Government of the Integrity Treaty of the 2nd 
November, 1907, would not be against the interests of the 
British Empire.' 
The WhitehaJI debate on the integrity treaty reveals some 
interesting contrasts in national mentalities. The Norwegians 
naturally had no inkling of what the British were ,thinking. If 
they had, they might have been surprised that a treaty to 
which they now attached no practical significance was still 
taken so seriously by a great power. There is no indication 
that Britain's deliberations on Norwegian neutrality during the 
First World War had been influenced by the existence of the 
integrity treaty. However, the British had undoubtedly been 
restrained (as they were to be again in 1939-40) by the impact 
that a violation of Norwegian neutrality would have had on 
world opinion. However little value Norwegians attached to 
the treaty, they would undoubtedly have cited the treaty if its 
provisions had been breached by Britain or any other belliger-
ent power. In dismissing the treaty so readily, post-war 
Norwegians (like Koht in 1940) were perhaps taking an 
over-cynical view of the conduct of great powers. Paper 
guarantees may occasionally be of some value. To this extent 
the British did take their international obligations seriously, 
though they were naturally not averse to being relieved of 
them in such a painless way as Norway had offered. 
Following approval of the proposisjon by the constitutional 
committee of the Stoning on 10 July 1922, the Norwegian 
government officiaJIy informed the four signatory powers that 
the treaty was to be regarded as being no longer in force.92 
Both France and Germany gave their consent, but the grounds 
on which they based it were totally at variance. The German 
government, as was to be expected, based its acceptance solely 
34 
on the change in international conditions which had come 
about since 1907. Since it was not a member of the League, 
it could accept no obligations in respect of the League 
Covenant." The French, while accepting Norway's wish, 
pointed out that membership of the League did not necessarily 
invalidate the 1907 treaty and cited Article 21 of the League 
Covenant in support of their view." More importantly, they 
rejected the argument that the treaty had lapsed owing to 
changed international circumstances. The French insisted 
(rightly) that 'une telle application d'une doctrine des plus 
dangereuses pour le principe du respect des tmites ne saurait 
etre acceptee que pour des cas tout a fait exceptionnels.' The 
British replied briefly on 22 August, merely recording their 
acceptance of the change and natumlly giving no hint as to 
the nature of their internal discussions." 
The problem of the Soviet Union 
Nothing, meanwhile, had been heard from the Soviets. The 
Norwegian note had been delivered to Kamkhan, the deputy 
commissar for foreign affairs, on 29 July, but no reply was 
received until 25 October." By the middle of 1922 Norweg-
ian-Soviet relations were in a state of suspended animation. 
In the trade agreement of September 1921 Norway had been 
the first country in the world to recognise the Soviet go-
vernment's foreign trade monopoly. The agreement had also 
entailed de facto recognition of the Soviet government. 
However, there had subsequently been little development of 
trade between the two countries and Norwegian fishing 
interests were vocal in their demands for an agreement to sell 
herring to the Soviets. Further problems resulted for Nor-
wegian fishermen and hunters from the Soviet declaration in 
May 1921 of a 12-mile territorial limit in the Arctic Ocean, 
and of the White Sea as an internal sea. There was growing 
pressure for full de jure recognition, not merely from labour 
circles but also from businessmen and prominent figures such 
as Nansen and EUa Anker. The government realised for its 
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part that without de jure recognition the Soviets were unlikely 
to acknowledge the Paris treaty of February 1920 giving 
Norway sovereignty over Svalbard. It was reluctant to take 
over control of the archipelago without having reached prior 
agreement with Norway's powerful neighbour. 
The Soviet leadership had mixed feelings about Norway. 
Krasin told Kollontai before her appointment as counsellor to 
the Soviet trade delegation in Christiania in the autumn of 
1922 that Norway was 'a nice country, and we have many 
friends there. ,,., There were sympathisers not only among the 
communists but within the labour movement as a whole, and 
Norway had been forthcoming on trade questions. However 
Surits, the head of the trade delegation, wal thoroughly 
dismissive. 'What do we have here?', he complained. 'Herring 
plus seals. A dull country. Even their liberals are spineless, 
and as for their conservatives, they're trailing along behind 
England. ," Between the two extremes stood Chicherin, the 
people's commissar for foreign affairs. For him Norway was 
clearly not a country of the first importance, but it was 
nevertheless of value for the Soviet Union, as he told Kollon-
tai, to 'establish nonnal diplomatic relations': 'We already 
signed quite a good trade agreement with Norway in 1921, but 
it is only a recognition of us de facto. There should be mutual 
recognition de jure.'''' Though he did not share Surits's 
hostility towards Norway, Chicherin's inveterate suspicion of 
Great Britain made him alert to any indication that Norway 
might be unduly exposed to British influence. When British-
Soviet relations deteriorated in 1923, Chicherin (like his 
colleague Litvinov) became, as we shall see, less tolerant of 
what he saw as Norwegian procrastination on the question of 
de jure recognition. 100 In the autumn of 1922, however, there 
seemed no reason for the Norwegians to fear any change for 
the worse. On the contrary, the omens seemed good for the 
settlement of a number of outstanding questions on favourable 
tenns. In November negotiations for de jure recognition were 
reported to be taking place in Stockholm. On 18 November 
Mowinckel had sufficient confidence to draft a memorandum 
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setting out the terms on which Norway would grant recogni-
tion. They included a revision of the trade agreement to give 
Norway most-favoured-nation treatment; hunting and fishing 
rights in the Soviet Arctic; the recognition of Norwegian 
sovereignty over Svalbard and Bear Island; and a Soviet 
acknowledgement 'without further discussion' that the integrity 
treaty was no longer in force .101 Already, however, the 
Soviets had served notice that on one question at least - the 
integrity treaty - they had no intention of complying with 
Norway's wishes. 
When he received the Norwegian note on 29 July 1922, 
Karakhan admitted that 'for the moment he could not recall 
the Norwegian integrity treaty' but thought that in view of 
the present Russian government's altitude towards old treati-
es, no difficulties were likely to be raised on the Soviet side. 
Nothing could have been funher from the truth. On 25 
October Litvinov, another leading member of the Commis-
sariat for Foreign Affairs, finally conveyed the Soviet re-
sponse. The Russian note was discouraging. It declared that 
the Soviet government could not accept that the principles 
expressed in the integrity treaty no longer applied to the 
relationship between Russia and Norway. It proposed that the 
two governments should work together to find means of 
affirming the ideas embodied in the treaty. This was 
thoroughly alarming. In the course of the next two days, 
Jakhelln, the head of the Norwegian delegation in Moscow, 
attempted to discover what lay behind the Soviet note. He 
spoke first to Litvinov, then to the two heads of department 
in the Commissariat for Foreign Affairs who were most 
directly concerned with the matter, and finally to Chicherin 
himself.loz 
From Litvinov Jakhelln learned that the Commissariat had 
acted on the assumption that Norway had negotiated first with 
the other signatories and only then made its approach to the 
Soviet Union. From the two department chiefs he gathered that 
the Soviets really did want a new agreement with Norway to 
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replace the integrity treaty. With Chicherin Jakhelln held three 
lengthy late-night conversations on the question. Revealing 
Chicherin's deep (though sometimes defective) knowledge of 
Russian diplomatic history as well as his pathological suspi-
cion of Great Britain, they did little to clarify Soviet motives. 
Chicherin started by referring to the long-standing good 
relations between Norway and Russia. The Soviets had not 
forgotten, he said, that Norway had been one of the last 
powers to break off diplomatic relations, and that it had done 
so under pressure from the Entente.lD) The treaty signed by 
Russia in 1907 marked a declaration that Russia had no 
unfriendly feelings towards Norway and did not covet any 
Norwegian harbours, even though some circles in Petrograd 
had had their eye on them. Russia could not be influenced by 
the actions of Britain and France and would not be dictated to 
by the League. The integrity treaty should therefore be 
replaced, as far as Norway and Russia were concerned by 
some new arrangement which would embody the ideas of 
1907. Finally Chicherin let fall some remarks about the 
Finnish activists and 'imperialists' who wished to annex both 
Petrograd and the Norwegian county of Finnmarken. 
Jakhelln's misgivings about this conversation were confirmed 
when a second note, of 23 November, reiterated the Soviet 
government's earlier position: it did not accept that the treaty 
had lapsed but was willing to negotiate changes. He surmised 
that the intention might be to put pressure on Norway to grant 
the Soviet government de jure recognition. 
Jakhelln challenged Chicherin directly on the point when he 
met him in another late-night encounter on 25 November. IM 
Russia's desire to protect Norwegian integrity against Nor-
way's wishes seemed, Jakhelln said, to be the expression of 
an imperialistic policy more in keeping with the old Russian 
regime than with the new Soviet government. He could only 
assume that it had something to do with the question of de 
jure recognition. Chicherin replied that this assumption was 
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quite wrong. He reminded Jakhelln that the treaty contained 
not only obligations on the part of the great powers, but also 
an obligation by Norway not to relinquish any part of Nor-
wegian territory - and this clause was of great imponance to 
Russia. Chicherin explained Soviet interest in the integrity 
treaty by reference to the history of the 1907 negotiations - or 
at least his version of them - and went on to draw lessons for 
the present. At the time, he stated (incorrectly), there had been 
an exchange of views between St Petersburg and London. 
Whilst the Russian government had declared that it had no 
designs on Narvik, the British government had declared that 
it had no intention of occupying the Varanger Fjord or any 
other part of northern Norway. In the present international 
situation it was of great importance for Russia to have an 
assurance that Norway would not place territory at England's 
disposal. Britain threatened Russia in the Near East; Russia for 
its part had to prevent itself fTOm being placed in a vice, with 
pressure being exerted from the north as well as the south. 
Hence Russia's desire to negotiate with Norway. In return 
Russia might recognise the Svalbard treaty and (again playing 
on a supposed common antagonism towards Finland) support 
a rectification of the Norwegian-Finnish frontier in Norway's 
favour. The circumstances, Chicherin concluded, were similar 
to those prevailing after the Russo-Japanese war. lakhelln was 
not sure what he meant by this. Presumably Chicherin was 
thinldng about the way in which skilled diplomacy (notably 
that of Izvolsii) had contributed to Russia's remarkable 
recovery in the aftermath of military defeat and revolution. 
Jakhelin could only try to reassure Chicherin that neither the 
present nor any future Norwegian government wished to place 
territory at Britain's disposal, and that Britain itself had shown 
no desire to use Norwegian territory as a basis for operations 
in the recent great war. 
Chicherin's final remarks on the question, two days later, 
openly linked the question of Svalbard with that of the 
integrity treaty, implying that a more accommodating Soviet 
attitude over Svalbard would depend on a more accommo-
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dating Norwegian attitude on the integrity treaty. to, Given this 
choice, Iakhelln suggested in his despatch to Christiania, the 
Norwegian government would no doubt prefer to leave the 
status quo unaltered until the time when the integrity treaty 
could be denounced. He, at any rate, would attempt to ensure 
in his dealings with Litvinov over Spitsbergen that the two 
questions were kept entirely separate. In fact, as we have seen, 
just such a linkage had been envisaged by Mowinckel in his 
memorandum of 18 November, and was eventually to form the 
basis of the agreement on de jure recognition reached in 
February 1924. 
By the end of 1922 the Norwegians had been forced to 
recognise that the Soviet position on the integrity treaty was 
immovable. What lay behind it? Several motives are con-
ceivable. One is suggested by the first comment on the Soviet 
proposals when they reached the British Foreign Office in 
1923: 'It is evident that the Soviet government desire to obtain 
a pretext for interfering in Norway where a portion of the 
population has Bolshevik sympathies. '106 This supposition was 
not wholly unfounded. Communism certainly held a persistent 
appeal for many of the inhabitants of the sparsely populated 
far north of Scandinavia. I07 Around 1920 the Finnish commu-
nist Edvard Gylling, later prime minister of the Karelian 
Autonomous Socialist Republic, devised a plan by which 
'northern Finland, northern Sweden and northern Norway 
should, at some opportune time, be forcibly incorporated into 
Soviet Karelia, which would thus be expanded into the Soviet 
Republic of the North.'I'" The Soviet government was probably 
not involved in the plan though it was well aware that there 
was widespread agitation in northern Norway in 1920 aimed 
at separation and joining the Soviet state. I09 But by 1922 it 
can scarcely have regarded such a goal as achievable. 
A second consideration was suspicion of the League of 
Nations and everything connected with it. Danielsen points 
out that it was natural that the Soviet government should react 
against the form taken by the Norwegian government's 
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initiative on the integrity treaty, with it~ references to the 
League Covenant and Versailles. HO It was extremely sensitive 
towards anything which might be interpreted as discriminatory 
treatment from the world at large. The Soviet regime wished 
to increase its international authority at a time when many 
states were seeking to isolate it. Hence its insistence that the 
treaties signed by the tsarist government remained valid. 
There was continuity with tsarist Russia in another respect. 
Like its predecessor, the Soviet government had a real interest 
in maintaining the status quo in the north.llI Soviet policy 
naturally favoured an agreement which could prevent other 
states from establishing strategic positions in a region close to 
its frontiers. This explains its desire to see the integrity treaty, 
if it were not to remain in force, replaced by a new security 
arrangement between Norway and Soviet Russia. This trad-
itional defensive preoccupation was given a new ideological 
edge by the need to prevent Norway from becoming an 
advanced base for British imperialism. Chicherin's emphasis 
on this point in his exchanges with Jakhelln must undoubtedly 
be taken seriously. And Chicherin, despite his eccentricities, is 
not a figure to be underestimated. Although he was later to be 
shifted to the sidelines by Stalin and by his erstwhile sub-
ordinate Litvinov, the architect of Rapallo was at this stage 
central to Soviet decision making on foreign affairs.1ll 
Finally there is the question of de jure recognition. This was 
the goal repeatedly emphasised both in the private exchanges 
within the Soviet leadership and in its diplomatic encounters 
with the Norwegians. With this end in view, everything that 
the Norwegians wanted - from recognition of their sovereignty 
over Svalbard to hunting and fishing rights in the Arctic to 
the abrogation of the integrity treaty - was grist to the Soviet 
mill: bargaining material for obtaining diplomatic recognition. 
The integrity treaty was especially important in this connect-
ion, since it was the most explicit link between the inter-
national rights enjoyed by the tsarist regime and those claimed 
by its Soviet successor. In February 1922 Jakhelln sent to 
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Utemiksdepartementct an article published by the Commissariat 
for Foreign Affairs on the Soviet Union's relations with 
Norway in the year 1922.'13 He drew attention not only to its 
notably friendly tone, but also to the fact that it echoed 
Chicherin's emphasis on Norway's obligations under the 1907 
treaty. Norway's approach to the Soviet government on the 
question amounted, it said, to a recognition that it was the 
legal successor to previous Russian governments, 'or in other 
words: it recognises it de jure. ,", Of course withholding 
consent to the abrogation of the integrity treaty did not bring 
de jure recognition any closer. Nor could the Soviets do 
anything to prolong the treaty. At most they could prevent it 
from lapsing before its tennination date in 1928. However, this 
presumably mattered less than the principle that no change 
could be made without the Soviet government's consent as an 
equal partner, and as legitimate heir to all the rights of its 
tsarist predecessor. 
Exchanges with the signatory powers: 
second phase 1923-24 
The Norwegians now had to decide how to proceed in the 
face of Soviet opposition. At first Utenriksdepartementet 
considered a fairly sharp protest note. liS By January 1923 the 
foreign ministry had decided that the best approach would be 
to conclude a protocol with the British, French and Gennan 
governments confinning that the treaty was no longer in force, 
which would then be registered with the League of Nations. 
They might infonn the Soviet government before approaching 
the three other powers to give it the opportunity to join in. If 
it refused, they could infonn the League of the fact and send 
the Soviet government a fonnal denunciation in accordance 
with Article 3 of the treaty.'" Bull reiterated the point that any 
communication to the Soviets must merely record the lapse of 
the integrity treaty as an established fact: anything more would 
imply recognition of the Soviet government as possessing the 
same rights under the treaty as its tsarist predecessor. It might 
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even be taken to imply de jure recognition. In The legations 
in London, Paris and Berlin were requested on 16 February 
to propose this procedure to the three western governments. 
British and French responses, 
February - March 1923 
Following the CID's decision in July 1922 that the lapse of 
the integrity treaty would be in Britain's interest, the Foreign 
Office was not unduly concerned about the preCise means by 
which this was to be achieved. There was of course no 
question of Britain's signing any kind of joint protocol with 
the Soviet Union, and a junior official suggested that the 
Norwegians should be warned against concluding a separate 
agreement with the Soviets. He was overruled. 'It is perhaps 
wiser not to interfere', Gregory remarked."' On 16 March 
1923 the British therefore accepted the Norwegian proposal, 
suggesting only that it would be desirable to follow the 
precedent of the abrogation of the 1855 treaty guaranteeing the 
integrit), of Norway and Sweden (Ule immediate predecessor 
of the 1907 treaty).'" 
As they had done in 1922, the French raised significant 
objections to the procedure proposed by the Norwegians. 
Again they did so not in a negative spirit, but in order to 
meet Norwegian wishes while 'sans toutefois crecr un prece-
dent qui risquerait d 'etre dangereux pour le respect dti aux 
traites'.'" Pointing out that the treaty had been renewed in 
1918 and remained valid until 1928, they recommended on 
12 March that the French, British and Gennans should 
mutually agree among themselves not to regard it as being in 
force, and then denounce it in 1928. In support of their case 
they cited the London Declaration of 17 January 1871, 
according to which a treaty could not be abrogated or modi-
fied without the consent of all the contracting parties. 
43 
In Britain the French proposal, communicated on 28 March, 
was at first greeted with suspicion. One member of the 
Foreign Office's Treaty Department did not regard it as 'any 
improvement on our own', while another suspected that 'the 
French may be trying to lay a trap for us in this matter': 
If they can get us to assent to what they think about the 
1871 declaration, they may be able to use it against us 
in future negotiations with regard to the Rhine. We 
recently considered the possibility of Great Britain 
withdrawing from the Rhine Convention without consul-
ting the French or the Belgians. I therefore think that 
this matter requires careful izandling.J21 
Even the more considered view of Sir Cecil Hurst was that 
'Norway has got nothing to do except denounce the treaty 
and her purpose will then be achieved. ,122 However, a more 
thorough examination of the treaty's origins lent weight to the 
French interpretation: 
The treaty was contemplated as a means of pacifying 
the North and was not given perpetuity only because it 
was feared that such perpetuity might make it a dead 
letter. It was originally intended to make it effective for 
periods of 20 years, denunciation to take place within 5 
years before the 20 years period expired. 
In its present form Article 3 appears to me to intend, 
though it does not say so in words, that while denun-
ciation may take place at any time, no sudden denun-
ciation shall be effective at any time other than the 
stated 10 years periods/21 
Hurst therefore recommended acceptance of the French 
proposal. I " The British decision was communicated to the 
Norwegians on 17 May. 
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Norway adopts the French proposal 
Long before Utenriksdepartementet learned of Britain's 
acquiescence in the procedure proposed by the French, it had 
been forced to make up its own mind on its merits. Jens Bull 
realised that there was much to be gained from accepting the 
French proposal even though it conflicted with the Norwegian 
interpretation of the treaty's status. 'In reality,' he wrote, 'we 
obtain all that we want by the French proposaL ,'25 Others, 
however, were more reluctant to give way and expressed the 
hope that in any exchange of notes the Norwegian government 
would maintain its earlier view that the treaty had already 
lapsed.'" More importanUy, a warning note had belatedly been 
sounded from Berlin. On 10 March 1923 Arne Scheel, now 
Norwegian minister to Germany, responded to the instructions 
he had been sent on 16 February. Scheel warned against 
taking German acquiescence for granted. l27 First, it was 
practically certain that they would not sign any joint protocol 
with France. For this reason Scheel suggested that Norway 
should sign separate protocols with each power. Utenriks-
departementet accepted his advice on this point."' Secondly, 
Scheel went on, the Germans now attached great importance 
to the close relationship with Russia established at Rapallo in 
April 1922. He argued that before making its approach to the 
other powers, Norway should 'open friendly discussions with 
Russia': 'The most important thing is that we should not, 
being in a weak contractual position, treat the Soviet Union 
in a nonchalant manner and in a way likely to antagonise 
it. .129 
Utenriksdepartementet did not follow this part of Scheel's 
advice. Instead, it took upon itself the task of responding to 
the opinions expressed in Narkomindel's survey· of Soviet 
foreign policy in 1922 which had been reported by Jakhelln 
on 3 February (p. 39 above).'" Changed into the less formal 
form of a note-verbale after consultation with the Storting's 
foreign policy committee, the Norwegian communication was 
nevertheless unconciliatory.l3l It contested the Soviet view that 
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Norway's earlier notes on the integrity treaty implied an 
acknowledgement of the Soviet government as the legal 
successor of previous Russian governments - in other words, 
de jure recognition. The Moscow delegation was instructed on 
5 April to deliver the note-verbale. The instructions did not 
arrive until 30 April; the note was delivered on 1 May and a 
reply was finally received on 30 June. Apart from making 
some basic factual errors about the terms of the integrity 
treaty, the Soviets again denied that the 1907 treaty had gone 
out of effect and asserted the right of each party to draw what 
conclusion it liked about whether or not Norway had given the 
Soviet government de jure recognition. i3l Utenriksdepartementet 
responded by advising the Moscow legation that it was 
'scarcely necessary to continue the discussion' but nevertheless 
took the opportunity to correct the Soviet errors.lJJ 
Following the fall of the Liberal government on 6 March 
1923, the Conservatives had returned to office under Halvor-
sen, with Michelet again as foreign minister. The new govern-
ment had to decide whether to go along with the procedure 
proposed by the French. There could be little doubt that 
Norway would acquiesce even before the French proposal 
received the backing of Great Britain. At the end of March 
Utenriksdepartementet sent a memorandum on the current 
position on the integrity treaty question to the king and to 
each member of the government.!34 In early May the cabinet 
decided to accept the French proposal.'" The question was 
discussed in a secret session of the Storting on 9 June which 
concurred in the standpoint taken by the foreign ministry and 
by the government.!36 As we have seen (pp. 26-8 above), there 
was general agreement that the treaty should go, although 
there was criticism of the government's allegedly cavalier 
treatroent of the Soviets from both Hambro at one end of the 
political spectrum and the communist members Schel10 and 
Egede-Nissen at the other. On 26 June an approach was 
finally made to the German government, without mentioning 
the fact that the proposed procedure had originated with the 
French.1l7 
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Between the Soviets 
and the Western powers 
Norway's relations with the Soviet Union in 1923 were even 
more frustrating than they had been in 1922. With the 
departure of Mowinckel from the foreign ministry in March, 
the process of rapprochement lost some of its momentum. In 
May, however, Kollontai became acting head of the Soviet 
trade delegation in place of Surits. Authorised by Krasin to 
go ahead with an agreement by which Norway was to sell 
herring to Russia in exchange for grain, she threw herself into 
the negotiations with great energy and clinched the deal on 24 
June. "" For Kollontai, fish was only one of 'a series of 
preparatory steps' leading to de jure recognition.'" That this 
priority was shared in Moscow was shown in July, when the 
Soviet government requested permission for a naval training 
squadron to visit Norwegian ports. 'I gather from Litvinov' s 
telegram that he is raising this question to urge the Storting to 
proceed even during its current term to discuss recognition of 
our state', Kollontai noted on 15 July.!40 Already, however, the 
improvement in Norwegian-Soviet relations had fallen victim 
to a drastic deterioration in Russia's relations with the West. 
This resulted mainly from the change of government in Britain 
in the autumn of 1922, when the Lloyd George coalition had 
been replaced by a Conservative government under Bonar 
Law. Unlike his predecessor, the new prime minister made no 
attempt to restrain the hostility towards the Soviet regime of 
the man who served as foreign secretary in both admini-
strations, Lord Cur,wn.!'! The latter's ideological and imperial 
preoccupations were widely shared within the Conservative 
Party as well as in the Foreign Office. The 'Curzon note' 
handed to the Soviet government on 8 May 1923 was intended 
to clear the way for a breach with the Soviets. It catalogued 
an accumulation of grievances concerning, among other things, 
the treatment of British subjects and of Russian priests, as 
well as communist propaganda in India and the Near East. 
One complaint concerned a matler which touched closely on 
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Norwegian interests: the arrest of British trawlers off the north 
Russian coast. Two had been arrested early in 1922. Both had 
been outside the three-mile limit: one appeared to have been 
outside the twelve-mile limit claimed by the Russians; the 
other had sunk in a storm while in Russian custody. Although 
the crews were released in February 1923, a third trawler was 
arrested in March and a fourth on 7 May 1923, just before the 
delivery of the Curzon note. In April 1922 the British govern-
ment had despatched a warship to protect British fishing 
vessels outside the three-mile limit. It did so again on 10 May 
1923. A ship was sent to the Murman coast with instructions 
'to prevent interference with British vessels outside the 
three-mile limit, using force if necessary."" Sympathisers with 
the Soviet regime were not the only ones to wonder why such 
a drastic measure was necessary, in view of the fact that 
Britain had been disputing Russian claims to a twelve-mile 
limit since pre-war days.'" 
The British government disclaimed any intention of going to 
war with Russia, and the crisis occasioned by the Curwn note 
was defused by a series of conciliatory responses fTOm the 
Soviet side, as well as by the replacement of Bonar Law by 
Baldwin on 22 May. The new prime minister exerted his 
influence to avert a breach of relations. Nevertheless the 
confrontation between Britain and Russia in the far north 
continued to alarm the Norwegians. The British warship, HMS 
Harebell, was based at the Norwegian port of Vard~. During 
the Starting's secret debate on the integrity treaty of 9 June 
1923, the communist member Egede-Nissen argued that the 
British presence lent force to Soviet fears of what might 
happen if the treaty lapsed. The British could use Norwegian 
territory as a naval base for war with Russia.'44 This charge 
provoked a vehement response from Mowinckel, who declared 
that Britain was merely defending the interests of iLs large 
fishing fleet in northern waters and that, being so far from 
home, its ships had no choice but to use Norwegian ports for 
taking on coal and supplies. For Norway, he said, it was 
merely a mauer of hospitality. 'The moment that conflict 
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breaks out between England and Russia, Norwegian harbours 
will be closed to English warships. 0145 
The controversy over the British naval visit had scarcely died 
down before the Soviets made their request to send a training 
squadron to Norway. It was mentioned by Michelet in a 
further closed session of the Storting on 10 July which had 
been arranged at Mowinckel's request in order to provide an 
opportunity for a discussion of the full range of outstanding 
foreign policy issues.146 Michelet stated that to accept such a 
visit would bring Norway close to de jure recognition (as 
Litvinov had intended): he therefore proposed not to allow it 
for the time being. On the question of recognition the foreign 
minister remained cautious. 'In my opinion,' he said, 'Norway 
should be one of the first countries to recognise Russia de 
jure .... But I do not believe the time has yet come. '147 He saw 
no indication that Britain's altitude had changed. As usual, 
Mowinckel spoke in favour of speedy recognition: it was 
important for the question of Norwegian sovereignty over 
SValbard as well as for the development of trade. But Norway 
must not be too late. Mowinckel remarked revealingly that 'it 
would be rather humiliating for Norwegian foreign policy if, 
for example, Sweden and Denmark should steal a march on us 
in relations with Russia. '148 
However, throughout the summer and much of the autumn of 
1923 there was no sign that the Western powers were yet 
prepared to relent on the question of recognition. In the face 
of the detennined stand taken by Great Britain, France and 
the United States, it was impossible for Norway to break 
ranks, not least because of the unfortunate consequences that 
might follow for its financial situation. There were numerous 
warnings, from London and elsewhere, that the country's 
credit position would suffer if Norway went ahead alone. I" 
Yet solidarity with the West entailed further damage to 
Norway's relations with Russia. When Kollontai visited 
Moscow in August 1923 she found Krasin preoccupied with 
the consequences of the Curzon note, including his own recall 
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from London, though he approved the fish agreement that she 
had concluded with the Norwegians. Litvinov, however, was 
hostile: 'Norway is a dependent country. Just why should it 
recognise us?' As for Chicherin, 'He offered me no advice, 
nor did I get any directives from him. He lakes little interest 
in what we have been doing in Norway.'I" Chicherin's only 
concern was that Russia should sign the Paris treaty on 
Svalbard as a means of achieving international recognition.''' 
Presumably the Soviet leaders had lost interest in Norway 
once it had become clear that it could not be detached from 
the West's urtited front. As Scheflo had warned his colleagues 
in the Storting on IQ July, if Norway was the first country to 
recognise Russia this was something which would be valued 
very highly, but the Soviets would be quite indifferent if 
Norway came third, fourth or fifth in line behind Great 
Britain.'" 
The Soviets continued in their attempt to achieve recognition 
via Svalbard. Michelet, however, was determined - contrary 
to the approach pursued by Mowinckel as foreign minister -
to keep the two issues separate. IS) In a note of 7 November 
1923 the Soviet government suggested that a solution to the 
Svalbard question might be reached if Norway was prepared 
to contemplate 'la discussion des autres questions politiques 
restees jusqui'ici en suspense entre les deux Gouverne-
ments.'154 This, Kollontai noted in her diary, was 'a decisive 
step on our part. The Norwegian government must respond, 
it cannot fail to. 'ISS But Michelet remained evasive, still 
awaiting a change of mood among the Western powers. Only 
towards the end of 1923, with a shift of opinion in Italy and, 
mOTe importantly, Labour'S election victory in Great Britain, 
did the situation suddenly appear more hopeful. 
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The end of the integrity treaty 
Following Norway's approach to the German government at 
the end of June 1923, progress on the treaty question was 
stalled once again. On this occasion the summer holiday 
arrangements of the Wilhelmstrasse appear to have been the 
chief culprit "6 There was no response until 25 September, 
when the German government gave a verbal reply to the 
Norwegian proposal. It turned out to be entirely positive, 
although Ministerialdireklor Wallroth admitted to Scheel that 
the Auswiirtiges Amt had at one time contemplated getting in 
touch with the Soviet government on the matter through the 
German embassy in Moscow.lS? The way was now clear for 
Utenriksdepartementet to begin drafting notes in October 1923 
to the three Western governments proposing an exchange of 
notes affirming that the treaty was no longer in force. Another 
note denouncing the treaty was prepared in late November for 
delivery to the Soviet government. 
It was decided in early December that unless negOtiatIOns 
leading to de jure recognition were to begin shortly, all four 
notes should be delivered simultaneously, since the Soviets 
might regard Norwegian silence on the matter as indicating 
acquiescence in their position. It was also better to have the 
treaty out of the way as soon as possible in case negotiations 
for de facto recognition did begin, since the Russians still 
appeared to regard the treaty as a lever for extracting con-
cessions from Norway.'" On 13 December the legations in 
London, Paris and Berlin were instructed to transmit draft 
notes to the respective governments (together with a copy of 
the note to the Soviet government) with a view to an ex-
change of notes on 8 January 1924."9 Apart from one minor 
modification suggested by the French, the three Western 
governments acquiesced entirely in the Norwegian proposal, 
and the formal exchange of notes duly took place on sche-
dule. l6O The three governments later agreed, at Norway's 
request, to make no announcement to the press. The denun-
ciation of the treaty in Moscow took place on the same day. 
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Receiving the Norwegian note, Litvinov expressed his surprise 
that Norway had chosen this moment to denounce the treaty.'·' 
Only the previous day, the Norwegian government had 
announced its readiness to begin negotiations for de jure 
recognltion.'·' The integrity treaty, Litvinov thought, could 
have been dealt with at the same time. It emerged from a 
later exchange with Fiorinskii, the head of Narkomindel's 
Western department (and one of the few former tsarist 
diplomats serving under the new regime), that the Soviets 
were still inclined to argue, on the basis of their mistaken 
reading of the text of the treaty (despite the correction 
provided by Utenriksdepanementet on 8 August 1923), that it 
could not be denounced unilaterally by Norway.''' JakheUn 
corrected the misapprehension once again and Fiorinskii 
promised that the Commissariat would reconsider the question. 
Norway's de jure recognition 
of the Soviet Union 
The first breakthrough on the question of de jure recognition 
had come with the return from Moscow to Christiania of 
Kollontai, now head of the Soviet trade delegation, on 16 
December 1923. Determined to 'force the pace of the talks 
on recognition','64 she saw Michelet the following day and 
offered a comprehensive package, including a solution to the 
Svalbard question, the regulation of hunting and fishing rights 
in the Arctic and concessions to Norwegian businessmen in 
Russia. Kollontai had also been authorised to make large 
purchases of industrial goods in Norway'" Given the shift in 
favour of recognition both at home and abroad, the govern-
ment decided on 21 December that it could hesitate no longer. 
Denmark and Great Britain had ratified the Svalbard treaty in 
December; if the Soviets agreed to do so as well, the treaty 
could be put to the Stoning for ratification in the session 
beginning in January 1924. In a note of 7 January the 
Norwegian government declared that it was ready to negotiate 
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with the Soviets on all outstanding economic and political 
questions. Negotiations were begun between the trade delega-
tion and Utenriksdepartementet, conducted principally by 
Kollontai and Esmarch. Despite Michelet's personal enthusiasm 
for recognition and the prospect of imminent recognition by 
other countries, notably Britain, there was still procrastination 
on the Norwegian side. This appears to have been due mainly 
to Esmarch's concern for the interests of those Norwegians 
who were claiming compensation for confiscated assets.'66 
Then, as Britain recol,'TIised the Soviet government on I 
February and Italy on the 9th, it was the Soviet turn to 
procrastinate. Litvinov ordered Kollontai 'not to make any 
promises even orally until there is an act of recognition' .'67 
Under pressure from all sides, the Norwegian cabinet accepted 
the Soviet draft agreement. The Storting gave its approval on 
12 February. 
An exchange of notes on 16 February marked Norway's full 
recognition of the Soviet government, as well as Soviet 
recognition of Norwegian sovereignty over Svalbard.'68 There 
was now no obstacle to the publication of the agreement to 
abrogate the integrity treaty. On 19 February the Storting was 
informed of the exchange of notes with the Western govern-
ments and of the denunciation of the treaty with the Soviet 
Union. Announcements in the Norwegian press soon followed, 
with most papers following the interpretations provided by 
Utenriksdepartementet and only Arbeiderbladet taking a more 
sympathetic view of the Soviet stance.'" Among foreign 
newspapers, only Le Temps and Izvestiia chose to report the 
event.'" On 1 August 1924 the foreign policy committee of 
the Stoning gave its formal approval to the government's 
procedure. m 
On 6 February 1928, unnoticed, the integrity treaty finally 
went out of effect. There is one final, enigmatic document in 
Utenriksdepartemente!'s files on the question: a brief, one-page 
ouUine of the origins of the treaty and the circumstances of its 
denunciation. It is dated 17 April 1939. A note by Jens Bull 
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of 18 April records: 'The above communicated to Stonings-
president Hambro today, in reply to a telephone enquiry to me 
yesterday.' We shall probably never know why Hambro 
wanted this information at this time. 
Conclusion 
The absence of the integrity treaty made little visible diffe-
rence to Norwegian security. For much of the inter-war period 
Norway's membership of the League of Nations performed 
much the same function as the integrity treaty had once done: 
as 'an expression of a non-binding and harmless alignment 
with the Western powers'.172 The collapse of collective security 
did not alter Norway's position in relation to Great Britain. 
Norwegian security remained wholly dependent on British 
naval power, but Norway could still do nothing to prevent 
Britain from violating its neutrality should the latter wish to 
do so. 
By 1939 the integrity treaty appears to have dropped entire-
ly out of the collective memory of policy makers in both 
Britain and Germany. In Britain, at least, there might have 
been an opportunity to examine the history of the treaty when, 
in the spring and summer of 1939, the Foreign Office and the 
Chiefs of Staff considered giving Norway some form of 
guarantee against German attack. l73 It clearly occurred to no 
one to do so. Nor does any Norwegian policy maker appear 
to have recalled the existence of the treaty with either nostal-
gia or regret during the dangerous months which preceded the 
German invasion of 9 April 1940. Carl Hambro, who had 
enquired about the history of the integrity treaty in April 1939, 
did not take the opportunity to draw the govemment's 
attention to it, though he had ample means for doing so if he 
wished. 
In the winter of 1939-40 both Britain and France on the one 
hand and Germany on the other were actively contemplating 
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military intervention in Scandinavia. If the existence of the 
integrity treaty had done nothing to restrain the belligerent 
powers during the First World War, it would presumably have 
been even less likely to do so during the Second, had it 
remained in force. Yet the neutrality of Norway (and Sweden) 
was undoubtedly a constraint on British and French policy. 
The framers of the integrity treaty had calculated correctly to 
this extent: that Britain was ultimately unprepared to violate 
Norwegian neutrality in either the First or the Second World 
Wars without a prior violation by the enemy. In a sense the 
Chiefs of Staff were acting in accordance with the spirit of the 
integrity treaty when they ordered that the expeditionary force 
destined for Norway in early April 1940 should set sail only 
when 'the Germans set foot on Norwegian soil, or there is 
clear evidence that they intend to do so.' 174 
The Soviet Union did not forget so quickly. It did not 
abandon the idea of concluding some kind of special securi-
ty arrangement with Norway of the kind that Chicherin and 
Litvinov had tried to salvage from the integrity treaty. In 
February 1928, during hcr second period of service as mini-
ster to Norway, KolIontai handed over a copy of the German-
Soviet non-aggression treaty of 1926 with the suggestion that 
it might serve as a model for an agreement between Norway 
and the Soviet Union.17S The matter was under discussion 
between the Norwegians and the Soviets for more than two 
years, but by 1930 it was evident that their views were too far 
apart for any agreement to be reached. Whereas the Soviet 
Union wished to conclude a neutrality and non-aggression 
pact, the Norwegians were prepared to consider only an 
arbitration treaty. They felt that the Soviet proposal would be 
incompatible with Norway's obligations as a member of the 
League of Nations and that it was a matter on which they 
should act in concert with the other Nordic countries. Never-
theless. the Norwegian-Soviet exchanges seem to have been 
taken more seriously by both parties than the discussions of 
similar pacts which took place between the Soviet Union and 
Sweden (1926-27) and Denmark (1930-31). As late as October 
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1930 Litvinov told Kollontai that the conclusion of an agree-
ment with Norway was a matter of 'great importance'.l70 On 
the Norwegian side Mowinckel showed himself to be consist-
ently in favour of some kind of agreement with the Soviet 
Union. He raised the question with the Soviet minister in 
Oslo, Bekzadian, after his return to government as prime 
minister and foreign minister in 1933, and in 1934 proposed 
to his Danish and Swedish colleagues a joint Scandinavian 
initiative for a non-aggression pact with the Soviets. On 
neither occasion was the initiative pursued very far. 
However the question of a Norwegian-Soviet agreement was 
revived after the end of the Second World War as the Soviet 
Union was taking steps to consolidate its security position in 
the northern sphere. Already in November 1944 Molotov had 
approached his Norwegian opposite number, Trygve Lie, with 
a proposal to revise the Svalbard treaty of 1920 to allow joint 
Norwegian-Soviet sovereignty over the archipelago. m Early in 
1948 there were hints that the Soviets might wish to establish 
a special security relationship with Norway similar to the one 
that was to be embodied in the treaty of friendship and mutual 
cooperation signed by Finland and the Soviet Union in April. 
The Soviet overtures, though they were not followed up, 
served to raise the temperature of the Cold War by several 
degrees. Particularly significant in this context were two 
telegrams sent by the ambassador in Moscow early in March 
to the Norwegian foreign minister Halvard Lange. l78 The first, 
sent on 5 March, suggested that 'it might be of interest to 
investigate possible notes and correspondence in the Depart-
ment's archive concerning plan for Norwegian-Soviet non-
-aggression treaty in 1930 or '31 under Mowinckel's govern-
ment.' The second, sent two days later, stated that 'one of my 
Russian connections' had referred in a private conversation 
about developments in Finland to plans for a NorwegianSoviet 
agreement in the inter-war period, but had nol elaborated 
further. Ambassador Berg's informant was the elderly Aleksan-
dra Kollonlai. Although her memory for dates may have been 
slightly faulty, Kollontai was still a figure to be taken 
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seriously as the embassy's only contact who had direct access 
to Stalin.'" 
Norway's leaders had few clear aims in mind when they 
initiated the procedure that was to lead to the disappearance 
of the integrity treaty, beyond a general feeling that the treaty 
was incompatible with Norwegian dignity. 
The Norwegians conducted their negotiations with the four 
signatory powers fitfully and sometimes with alarming in-
souciance, especially where the Soviet Union was concerned. 
They had little idea of what was going on in the minds of 
policy makers in Moscow, Berlin, Paris and above all Lon-
don. In the event, no harm was done. Norway was not 
important enough for its faux pas to do any lasting damage. 
The integrity treaty question may be seen as an example of 
a persistent Norwegian inability to grasp the complexities of 
conducting relations with more powerful neighbours - as one 
of a series of foreign policy failures that was to culminate in 
the disaster of 1940.180 There is an interesting parallel with 
what Rolf Tamnes has characterised as Norway's 'non-policy' 
on the question of Svalbard.I'1 Following its vigorous pursuit 
of 'Arctic imperialism' in the early 1920s, Norwegian policy 
became strangely passive once the Svalbard treaty had been 
ratified. It made little effort after 1925 to secure its sovereign-
ty, prcfening to react to the initiatives of others - in this case, 
those of the Soviet Union. The parallel is not exact. Norway's 
initiative over the integrity treaty was not aimed at achieving 
a higher international profile but was intended rather to clear 
away a relic of a bygone era of great-power politics. However, 
the end result was the same. Once the treaty was gone, 
Norway would be able to retreat into isolation - into a 
'non-policy' - frcc from the attentions of larger powers. 
But there is another side to the story. Norway was in the last 
resort a small country with only a limited capacity to influen-
ce the international environment in which it was forced to 
operate. Norwegian [oreib'T1 policy would not necessarily have 
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been more successful if it had been more 'realistic'. This is 
demonstrated by the career of Halvdan Koht - 'Norway's first 
Foreign Minister with a clearly formulated concept of the 
nation's foreign policy interests,l82 - between 1935 and 1940. 
No Norwegian politician between the wars had a clearer 
understanding of RealpoUtik or pursued a more active personal 
diplomacy.I" That war came to Norway in 1940 was not due 
to a failure of Norwegian diplomacy (though Koht certainly 
misjudged the relative threats posed by Germany and the 
Western Allies) but to a great-power conflict over which 
Norway had no control. The international situation in the early 
1920s was less threatening, but it was hazardous enough. No 
country was more exposed than Norway to the pressures 
generated by the deep ideological antagonism between the 
capitalist powers - among which Great Britain was foremost 
- and the new Soviet state. Norway could not afford to 
antagonise either of its powerful neighbours. A certain measure 
of passivity, of waiting on events, was unavoidable. To this 
extent Norwegian policy was pre-eminently realistic. I" The last 
word should perhaps be given to Christian Michelet. During 
the Storting's debate of 12 February 1924 on Norway's diplo-
matic recognition of the Soviet government the foreign 
minister expressed with unusual clarity the constraints placed 
upon the makers of Norwegian foreign policy: 
It is said that the government has been too cautious in 
this matter. I would reply that there is a deeper truth 
than many in this gathering will admit, in the words 
once spoken by prime minister Gunnar Knudsen in this 
place: that the time for Norway to recognise the Soviet 
will come only after certain great powers have done so. 
I beUeve that there is much to be said for the view that 
a small country like Norway should pursue a foreign 
policy which has some relation to its economic strength, 
the size of its population and its capacity to uphold its 
principles, its opinions, in the world at large.'" 
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Appendix: 
The NOllWegian integrity lilrelliy of 1907 
Treaty between the United Kingdom, France, Germany, 
Norway and Russia respecting the independence and territorial 
integrity of Norway. Signed at Christiania, November 2, 
1907186 
His Majesty the King of the United Kingdom and of Great 
Britain and Ireland and of the British Dominions beyond the 
Seas, Emperor of India; His Majesty the German Emperor, 
King of Prussia; the President of the French Republic; His 
Majesty the King of Norway; and His Majesty the Emperor 
of All the Russias, animated by the desire to secure to 
Norway, within her present frontiers and with her neutral 
zone, her independence and territorial integrity, as also the 
benefits of peace, have resolved to conclude a Treaty to this 
effect, and have named as their respective Plenipotentiaries: 
His Majesty the King of the United Kingdom and of Great 
Britain and Ireland and of the British Dominions beyond the 
Seas, Emperor of India, Mr. W.G. Max Muller, British Charge 
d' Affaires at Christiania; 
His Majesty the German Emperor, King of Prussia, M. de 
Treutler, his Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotenti-
ary at Christiania; 
The President of the French Republic, M. Delavaud, Envoy 
Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary at Christiania; His 
Majesty the King of Norway, M. J. /..flvland, his Minister of 
State and Minister of Foreign Affairs; 
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His Majesty the Emperor of All the Russias. M. A. de Krou-
pensky. his Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary 
at Christiania; 
Who. haVing communicated to each other their respective full 
powers, found in good and due form. have agreed as follows:-
ARTICLE I. 
The Norwegian Government undertake not to cede any portion 
of the territory of Norway to any Power to hold on a title 
founded either on occupation. or on any other ground whatso-
ever. 
ARTICLE 11. 
The German. French. British and Russian Governments 
recognize and undertake to respect the integrity of Norway. 
If the integrity of Norway is threatened or impaired by any 
Power whatsoever. the German, French, British. and Russian 
Governments undertake. on the receipt of a previous communi-
cation to this effect from the Norwegian Government. to afford 
to that Government their support. by such means as may be 
deemed the most appropriate. with a view to safeguarding the 
integrity of Norway. 
ARTICLE Ill. 
The present Treaty is concluded for a period of ten years from 
the day of the exchange of ratifications. If the Treaty is not 
denounced by any of the parties at least two years before the 
expiration of the said period. it will remain in force. in the 
same manner as before. for a further period of ten years and 
so on accordingly. 
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In the event of the Treaty being denounced by one of the 
Powers who have participated with Norway in the conclusion 
of the present Treaty, such denunciation shall have effect only 
as far as that Power is concerned. 
ARTICLE IV. 
The present Treaty shall be ratified and the rat!fications shall 
be exchanged at Christiania as soon as possible. 
In witness whereof the Plenipotentiaries have signed the 
present Treaty and have affixed thereto their seals. 
Done in quintuplicate at Christiania, 2nd November, 1907. 
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Abbreviations 
AA 
ADM 
CAB 
CID 
FO 
PA 
PRO 
SA 
VD 
Auswartiges Amt 
Admiralty 
Cabinet 
Committee of Imperial Defence 
Foreign Office 
Poli tisches Archi v 
Public Record Office 
Stortingets arkiv 
Utenriksdepartementet 
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;I 
After NOlWay's entry into the League of Nations in 1920, 
Norway approached Great Britain, France, Gennany and 
Russia, the four powers which had guaranteed the integrity of 
Norway in 1907, with a proposal to abrogate the integrity trea-
ty. The negotiations proved far more complex than had been 
expected. Largely owing to Soviet objections no solution could 
be reached until 1924, and the treaty did not fmally lapse until 
1928. 
This study shows how NOlWegian diplomacy drew the country 
unwittingly into the ideological antagonism between its two 
powerful neighbours, Great Britain and Soviet Russia. Through 
the use of British and Soviet sources it also reveals much 
about the political and strategic preoccupations of the two 
great powers in the early 1920s, and suggests that there was 
a continuity in Soviet attitudes towards Norway extending well 
into the Cold War period. 
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